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HI J IA VIOl{AL SelL 'JC1S 
COGNITIVE EGOCENTRICITY OF THE CHILD 
\\ lTHIN PIAGETlAN DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY I 
Viulet Kalyan-\lasih 
IJt'p:lflJnent of lIuman Development and the Family, 
L'niver,ity of Nebraska, Lincoln, 68503. 
In p,,1pular usage of the term, an egocentric person is a conceited and 
bUJSlful il1,lividual who is preoccupied with his own self-importance. There is, 
however, a fundamental difference between the cognitive egocentricity of a 
child as lk:'incc! by Piaget, and the egocentricity of an adult as is commonly 
understuod, A child is egocentric because he cannot take someone else's point 
of view: an adul t is egocentric because he will not - in one case, it is cognitive 
inability: in llie: otiler, social insensitivity. "Cognitive egocentrism," according 
to Piag~t. ., stems from a lack of differentiation between one's own point 
of view and I he ot her pussible ones ... " (11 ,p.4). Decentering is defined as 
the "ability 10 shift mental perspective, in social relationships as well as in 
others." (11 ,p.8) Egocentricity may also be defined as "the inability to 
dcccntcL to shin the given cognitive perspective (manque de de'centration)." 
(II ,p.]) Piaget has jLlstified the use of the term "egocentrism" as opposed to 
"centrism" becaLlse "the initial centering of perspective is always relative to 
one's OWJI positioll and action ... " (11 ,p,3) 
All dlildren are egocentric as they pass through the Piagetian cognitive 
continuum. Egocentrism is a developmental necessity which the child cannot 
escape. It is as unconscious as it is natural. It is a cognitive mode of dealing 
with reality, dillerent at each developmental level. This term has been the 
most criticized and least understood of Piaget's concepts, but he has "insisted 
upon its epistemological meaning ... rather than on its popular or 'moral' 
meaning." (15 ,p.118) At one point, however, even Piaget succumbed to the 
mounting criticism and stated: 
We no longer call it "egocentric," as one of us once did, in deference to the 
criticisms from many psychologists who arc still not familiar with the practice in the 
exact sciences of using a term only in accordance with the definitions proposed, 
irrespectih' of its popular meanings and associations. (15 ,p.61 , footnote 6) 
1 Published a, Paper number 3664, Journal Series: Nebraska Agricultural Experiment 
Station, 
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Pinard and Laurendeau, however, engaged in replicating Piagetian 
research on large samples in Canada, Africa, and other places report: " ... it 
seems reasonable to conclude that, at least in the development of projective 
spatial concepts, the egocentric attitude is regular enough to suggest that it 
reflects a genuine and consistent form of mental organization." (4,p.436) 
It matters little what we call it: egocentricity, or cognitive egocentricity, 
or Piagetian egocentricity, or X-egocentricity. The important point is that it is 
significant enough not to be dismissed easily. Broadly speaking, cognitive 
egocentricity is a lack of differentiation between self and nonself; between 
subjective and objective; between psychological and physical; or it is an 
imbalance between assimilation and accommodation. In one of his books, 
Piaget defines it as: 
•.. primacy of self-satisfaction over objective recognition ... and on the other, 
distortion of reality to satisfy the activity and point of view of the individuaL In both 
cases it is unconscious, being essentially the result of failure to distinguish between the 
subjective and the objective. (1 O,p.285) 
Egocentricity is decentered when differentiation between the two 
polarities is achieved. 
There are various aspects of cognitive egocentricity as the child moves 
along the Piagetian cognitive continuum through four developmental 
sequences; sensory motor (birth - 2 + years); preoperational (2 - 7 + years); 
concrete operational (7 - 11 + years); and formal operational (11 - 15 + 
years). 
Sensory motor egocentrism (birth - 2 years) 
At the beginning of postnatal life, the neonate is directly egocentric. 
According to Piaget, ". . . consciousness starts with an unconscious and 
integral egocentricity," (14,p.13) where self is at the center of reality, but is 
not aware of itself. "Psychoa~alysis has called this ... "narcissism," but it is 
important to understand that it is a narcissism without Narcissus, i. e., 
without any sense of personal awareness as such." (14,p.16) For the neonate, 
then, the self and the nonself are undifferentiated and globaL The universe of 
the neonate, so to speak, is centered on his own body and on his own 
movements. 
During the next few months, the infant becomes indirectly egocentric, 
that is, the focus now shifts from his own body to objects around him. Also, 
the activity primarily centered on his own body now extends to objects in the 
environment. For example, the thumb-sucking (action centered on his own 
body) now extends to sucking anything the hand can grasp. 
The next important step in the decentering of cognitive egocentricity is 
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, 'Cllllcitillli uf object permanence, When an infant searches for a hidden 
tlJC ,Il" . -' " " , 
ubject. it !11JV be mierred that, lur the mfant, the object contmues to eXIst 
. 'I' 'Ilckntlv \)1 hIS perceptual actIvIty or perceptual fIeld, ThIs behaVIOr 
I11C L pl ' 
'Iso ,ug~C5h that some diCi'erentiation between self and nonself has taken 
'~LtCL" " .• ' the construction of sulid and permanent objects is the first 
I.. pi,' ,,1' the transitiun from primitive total egocentricity to the final 
L'x,lIll t' ~ 
eiaburatiun (,fan external universe," (14,p,14) 
The evolution of practical space helps further in the decentering process, 
The unc\)Ordillatcd sensory spaces (oral, visual, and tactile) on the neonate's 
1'\1'11 bodv and centered on his own movements gradually develop into a 
practical space furnished with permanent objects, The ease of locomotion in 
the surruUmilI1!:, space during the second year of life also helps the child to 
c(lurdinalc his own displacements as well as the displacements of other 
objects, I Ierl' again, self is the reference point. The relationships and 
cli~plaCCIllCIl L; ~lre first coordinated between self and other objects, and only 
bter between ('lle object and another object. 
Piagct also refers to the primitive precausal egocentricity of the infant as 
"lllagico-phclluJllenalistic," "Phenomenalistic" because two events contiguous 
in time and space are causally linked; "magico" because the infant almost 
appears to have a magical belief in his own activity as the casual agent. For 
cxample, when an infant pulls at the cords of a toy hanging above his crib, 
almost anticipating and hoping to produce an event at a distance, it is inferred 
that he has a magical belief in his own efficacy or that feelings and longings 
are sufficient to bring about an event. By the end of the second year of life, 
however, the child begins to understand the necessity of spatial contacts 
bctween objects, He can push an object, but he can be pushed also, The 
lIlagical efficacy is diminished, but the differentiation between the subjective 
and objective is far from complete and has to be mastered during the next 
stagc, 
To summarize, then, the sensory motor egocentricity during the first two 
years of life implies a lack of differentiation between self and nonself, and a 
confusion between the activity of the self and the activity of the external 
world, This egocentricity is gradually decentered through a series of cognitive 
achievements which include the mastery of object permanence and evolution 
of practical space, There is a "miniature Copernican revolution" (14,p,79) 
which implies that for the child: (1) objects are external to self and self is 
only one object among many objects, and (2) objects exist independently of 
the activity of self and objects can act upon self just as self can act upon 
objects, Thus we find that the sensory-motor egocentricity becomes 
clecentered and a state of equilibrium is reached, But as the child advances to 
the next developmental level - the preoperational period - a new form of 
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egocentricity will have to be decentered, and a new form of equilibrium will 
have to be reached. 
Preoperatiollal Egocentricity (2 - 7 years) 
The transition from the sensory motor to preoperational level is marked 
by the appearance of mental representation or what Piaget prefers to call 
"semiotic functions." The semiotic functions include deferred imitation 
(imitation in the absence of a model), mental imagery, symbolic play, 
drawing, and language. The cognitive functioning on the plane of representa-
tion as opposed to the plane of sensory motor action of the previous stage is a 
definite advancement over the previous cognitive mode of dealing with 
reality. But this itself traps the child in a new form of egocentricity. The 
sensory motor child had to master the object; the preoperational child has to 
master the symbol or the object symbolized. The sensory-motor child had to 
learn to cope with the physical world of permanent objects; the preoperation-
al child has to learn to cope with two new additional worlds - the social 
world of people, and his own subjective world of inner representation. 
Preoperational cognitive egocentricity, then, implies a lack of differentiation 
between the symbol and the thing symbolized, between the inner 
psychological world and the outer physical world, and between self and the 
social world of people. Piaget has elaborated upon the cognitive egocentricity 
of this period at great length in several of his books: Language and Thought 
of the Child; Judgment alld Reasoning of the Child; Child's Conception of 
Reality; Child's Conception of Physical Causality; Moral Judgment of the 
Child; The Psychology of the Child. According to Piaget, the preoperational 
egocentricity has two forms: logical egocentricity, and ontological 
egocentricity. 
Thus there are two forms of egocentricity, the first logical and the second 
ontological. Just as the child makes his own truth, so he makes his own reality; he feels 
the resistance of matter no more than he feels the difficulty of giving proofs. (l3,p.167) 
The first provides the key to the child's judgment and reasoning, and the 
second provides the key to the child's conception of reality and causality. 
Logical exocentricity, lacking reversibility, reflection, or deduction will be 
discussed as: 
(a) Intellectual egocentricity, 
(b) Linguistic egocentricity, and 
(c) Symbolic egocentricity 
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Ontological egocentricity ~ill be discussed in relation to the child's con-
t 'on of reality and causalIty. cep 1 
Logical Egocentricity .. 
a. Intellectual egocentrlClty 
"The intellectual egocentricity is ... nothing more than a lack of 
coordination, a failure to group relations with other individuals as well as 
with other objects." (8,p.61) 
The first aspect of intellectual egocentricity manifests itself in the child's 
inability to compensate or coordinate differences in two dimensions. The 
three classical conservation experiments dealing with mass, weight, and 
volume are too well known to be discussed here in detail. It is sufficient to 
say that the child bases his judgments on only one dimension, or on one 
element of the situation. It is longer, therefore, it is more; or it is higher, 
therefore, it is more. The things as they appear have priority over things as 
they really are. The child's judgment is perception bound; he looks at static 
configurations rather than at transformations. His intuitive reasoning based on 
perception lacks reversibility; therefore, he cannot coordinate or compensate 
two dimensions in a given situation. 
The second aspect of intellectual egocentricity is the child's inability to 
view a situation from any other perspective but his own. For example, a 
child's judgments about the left and right side of a person seated or standing 
opposite to him would be absolute judgments about his own left or right side. 
Or in the well-known experiment of the three mountains viewed from 
different perspectives, the child's judgments are based on the way the 
mountains look from his own particular perspective only. He cannot cope 
with the multiplicity of possible perspectives and remains blind to all but his 
own perspective, as if that were the only one possible. 
The third aspect of intellectual egocentricity is the inability to handle the 
logic of relations. "Paul is a boy" remains the same whatever the perspective, 
but in statements of brother-sister or brother-brother relationships, two 
points of view have to be coordinated at one-and-the-same time. A child will 
answer correctly that he has two brothers, Paul and John, but has difficulty 
answering correctly how many brothers John or Paul has; he will leave 
himself out because he cannot view himself from the position of John or 
Paul. If three objects are placed as A, B, C, the child will have no difficulty in 
stating that B is in the middle, but will have difficulty making a relative 
judgment that B is to the right of A and to the left of C, at one-and-the-same 
time. " ... the child fails to grasp the logic of relations for lack of having 
established reciprocity, first between himself and other people, and then 
between himself and things." (7,p.l97) 
The fourth aspect of intellectual egocentricity may be seen in the moral 
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reasoning ot the child. In the early stages of moral development, the child has 
unilateral respect for the adult and is constrained by adult authority. 
Constraint, on the other hand, is always the ally of childish egocentrism. Indeed it 
is because the child cannot establish a genuinely mutual contact with the adult that he 
remains shut up in his ego. The child is, on the one hand, too apt to have the illusion of 
agreement where actually he is following his own fantasy ... (12,p.61) 
Lessening of adult authority and increase in mutual respect and 
cooperation helps in moral development and decentering of egocentrism. 
Also, in making moral judgments about situations involving lying or 
dishonesty, a preoperational child disregards the intentions of the wrong doer 
and judges an act moral or immoral from the external or material 
consequences only. This attitude of objective responsibility in moral 
judgments is also an aspect of egocentricity. (12) 
b. Linguistic egocentricity 
During the preschool period the child has acquired sufficient language to 
engage in verbal exchange but surprisingly enough much of the spontaneous 
language of the child is egocentric: repetition, monologue, or collective 
monologue. After analyzing the spontaneous speech of children over a period 
of one month during free play and free activity, Piaget found that 54-60% of 
the spontaneous speech of children between 3-5 years of age could be termed 
egocentric speech. For children between 5-7 years of age, 44-47% of 
spontaneous speech was egocentric. (7,p.206) Most of the time children talk 
to themselves, about themselves, as a sort of running commentary accom-
panying their action, assuming that everybody knows and understands what 
they are thinking or talking about. For example, one child will say, "I am 
going to put a nail here;" another may say, "I am going to paint the hat red." 
They believe that the other person always knows what they are thinking 
about and is acquail)ted with their reason for doing so ... " (7,p.28) Very 
often the monologue will be sprinkled with "because," "you see," but it is to 
be understood that the child talks about his actions to no one in particular. 
"To put it quite simply, we may say that the adult thinks socially, even when 
he is alone, and that the child under 7 thinks egocentrically, even in the 
society of others." (6,p.60). Egocentric speech becomes socialized speech 
vis-a-vis others. During play, when children are collaborating in action, a 
fight or disagreement may take place. It is solved first by hitting or pushing at 
the sensory motor level and only after some time at the symbolic level by 
means of a primitive dialogue, when each child will make his own assertions. 
It will be some time before there is even an attempt at primitive discussion 
when the child will try to communicate or will try to understand the 
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. w oint of the other child, or will defend his own point. The egocentric 
vleee~l of the child becomes socialized speech only in social collaboration. 
~saareeJ1lents, contradictions, and genuine discussion decenter egocentric 
I U"'aae Piaget (11,p.7) recognizes that environmental and situational ana "'. 
var~ations lllay increase or decrease egocentric speech, and suggests systematic 
studies of children's discussions. 
c. Symbolic egocentricity 
The symbolic play is one of the main activities of the preschool child. 
The symbolic play is "the purest form of egocentric and symbolic thought, 
and it is the assimilation of reality to the subject's own interest and the 
expression of reality through the use of images fashioned by himself." 
(8,p.l27) 
The symbolic egocentricity implies a lack of differentiation between the 
symbol and its referent. Children believe that names are part of the physical 
property of objects and that by distorting a name, you distort the object 
itself. In their symbolic games, also, the same lack of differentiation between 
the symbol and the thing symbolized is quite apparent. When a child pretends 
to be father, mother, butterfly or bunny, he is engrossed and enveloped in the 
symbol he has created to such an extent that he forgets to be himself. 
Symbolic play is, therefore, pure assimilation or incorporation of the external 
world into the subjective world of the child; where there are no rules, the 
child makes and violates his own rules. By means of symbolic play the child 
corrects external reality, resolves conflicts, and "above all, he compensates 
for and completes reality by means of a fiction." (14,p.23). When children 
create imaginary playmates, they do not differentiate between what is real 
and what is imaginary. The imaginary companions are real, who dictate order, 
dispense justice and correct reality. The drawings of preoperational children 
have a certain element of "transparency." For example, a face in profile will 
have two eyes; potatoes will be seen in a man's stomach because he had them 
for dinner. Piaget refers to this "transparency" as "intellectual realism" in 
children's drawings, in contrast with the visual realism of a more advanced 
stage. Piaget explains this as an aspect of egocentricity, because the child 
draws what he knows should be there rather than what he sees there. (15) 
Logical egocentricity, discussed as intellectual, linguistic, and symbolic is the 
key to understanding the limitations and achievements of the preoperational 
child's reasoning, thought, language, and play. Limitations are explainable in 
terms of cognitive egocentricity, and achievements help in the decentering of 
that egocentricity. 
Ontological egocentricity: relates to the child's conception of reality and 
causality. 
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During this period of life the child may pester the adults with "why" 
questions or with questions relating to the origin of things. 
In order to answer children's questions at their level of understanding, We 
must first understand what the child's conception of reality is; and second, 
we must understand his particular cognitive mode of dealing with the reality 
at that time. Piaget has answered these questions in two of his books: Child's 
Conception of Reality, and Child's Conception of Physical Casualty. What is 
reality to the child? At the beginning of life there is no distinction between 
"the I" and the external world. The self and the world are one, but "a 
progressive splitting up of this protoplasmic consciousness into two compl-
ementary universes -- the objective and the subjective" constitutes the idea of 
reality. (9,p.242) The ontological egocentricity is basically this: the inability 
of the child to differentiate between the subjective and the objective universe 
resulting in immature concepts of reality and immature judgments about 
physical causality. On one hand, mental phenomena are materialized -
dreams are pictures on the walls, thought is a voice in the mouth, names 
reside in the object; on the other hand, physical phenomena are attributed 
psychological characteristics - clouds know where they are going, lamp posts 
send dreams to annoy us, wind is alive. Through progressive differentiation of 
the internal and the external, the realism of the child moves towards 
objectivity; but still, the self and the world remain very close. " ... there is 
never complete objectivity: at every stage there remain in the conception of 
nature what we might call "adherences," fragments of internal experience 
which still cling to the external world." (9,p.244) Piaget distinguishes five 
forms of "adherences" which confuse child's judgments about physical 
causality: (1) Participation - almost magical belief that objects in the 
universe participate in human affairs, the sun and the moon follow us; (2) 
Animism - endowing life and consciousness to inanimate objects - the wind 
is alive; (3) Artificialism - everything is made for man: "the I" is replaced by 
"we;" - night comes so we can sleep; apples grow so we can eat them; (4) 
Finalism - everything has a function or purpose: rivers have to go to the 
ocean, or where else would they go; ships must float on the sea; and (5) 
Dynamism - notion of force: things have power almost like the muscular 
power of man; the air pushes the clouds. 
Piaget has attributed these various manifestations of precausality or 
"adherences" to the egocentricity of the child - tht: inability to separate the 
inner from the external world. The child sees the world in terms of and with 
reference to his own self. 
There is thercYore an egocentric logic and an egocentric ontology, of which the 
consequences are parallel: they both falsify the perspective of logical relations and of 
things, because they both start from the assumption that other people understand us and 
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'l'tl' 'is from the first, and that things revolve around us with the sole purpose of agree \\ t" • 
" '" 'Ill" rcscmblmg us. (9,p.302) 
sCf\'lng H·" v 
t)il' the wry existence of pre causal thinking among children has been de-
'I 1,,· "nne researchers and upheld by others. Pinard and Laurendeau examine 
I1lCU' ' ," 
this is:'u,' Jlld reconcile the differences between Deutsche and Hazlit (who 
reject the ;:ollcept) and Dennis and Russell (who uphold it) by concluding 
tl;:lt rnctilodoiof!.icai differences in analysis of data confounded the results. 
(3,p.l6-2f,) Their own replication of Piaget's research confirms beyond doubt 
the existcllc'C uf prccausal thinking and hence of ontological egocentricity. 
Th,-s,' h,lid's arc manifested with such frequency that they cannot be regarded as 
)lIrcll' indindl1al (1[ accidental. Out of a total of 500 children, ranging from four to 
;II'c!V;' \Cal s of age, 28.6 percent use realistic terms at least once during the examination; 
64.-+ pcrcl'!l1, animistic terms; 69.6 percent artificialistic terms; 46.6 percent, dynamistic 
tl'llllS: and 'CL6 percent finalistic terms. (3,p.245) 
By die' tlIne 1 he preoperational child has learned to differentiate between 
the psyc!lolugical and the physical (attained objectivity), or has learned to 
view a siuulion from a perspective other than his own (attained reciprocity), 
or has !earned to differentiate and coordinate multiple perspectives (attained 
relativity). the egocentricity has been decentered. He is functioning on a new 
cognitiv,' plane --- the plane of concrete operations. The concrete operations, 
thcn, art.' instrumental in overcoming the preoperational egocentricity. 
COllcrere Operational ~g()centricity (7 ~ 11 + years) 
Piaget has devoted vcry little space to discussing the egocentricity of this 
period. But if the cognitive development is orderly and continuous, the same 
principles of egocentricity, decentering, and equilibrium which apply to other 
periods apply to this period also. 
The emergence of concrete operations ~ concrete because they are 
performed on concrete objects ~ enables the child to do several things which 
he was unable to do formerly. For example, he can handle logico-
mathematical operations such as, numeration, seriation, classification, all of 
which involve reversibility_ But this new cognitive achievement imposes its 
own limitations and generates its own brand of egocentricity. 
The concrete operations are applied to the perceptual "givens" of 
here-and-now. So his mental formulations are attached to the empirical 
reality only, and are thus limited by it. His thinking is "describer-thinking" 
and the direction it takes is from actual to possible. His formulations are 
derived from the data; but if some evidence contradicts his formulations, he 
either rejects the data or tries to arrange the data to fit his own formulations. 
Thus the concrete operational "child often fails to distinguish between his 
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cuncrete thinking: and secondly, it shows a lack or dillercntiation between 
mental formulations derived from data and the data themselves, especially 
when contl:HY evidence is presented. 
Furma! Opera/ ionaL L~fJou'll triciZY (I 1 + years) 
The emergence of formal operations frees the child from the limitations 
and egocentricity of connete operations. Reasoning now becomes deductive 
based ()n vedxtl hypotheses of it ... , then ... It is capable of taking into 
account unllllllted possibilities beyond the data, beyond the here-and-now. 
The child C3n now think about thoughts rather than about things that exist Or 
he can perform what Piaget cills "second-order" operations. Reflection takes 
a round about turn, so to speak, similar to the Copernican revolution of the 
sensory motor child. The concrete operational child reasons from what is real 
to what is possible: the formal operational child reasons from what is possible 
to what is real. Thus there is a complete reversal in the direction which 
thinking takes. Reality now becomes one sub-set of N possible sets; formerly, 
possibility was simply an extension of reality. "Formal operations provide 
thinking with an entirely new ability that detaches and liberates thinking 
from concrete reality and permits it to build its own reflections and 
theories." (l4,p.63) According to Piaget all preadolescents and adolescents 
functioning at formal operational level have their own systems and theories to 
reform the world. This idealism is a natural and logical corollary of the 
hypothetical-deductive mode of thinking, which is the culmination of 
cognitive development. It is the belief in the power of his own reflection 
which is at the root of adolescent egocentricity. "It is metaphysical age par 
excellence; the self is strong enough to reconstruct the universe and big 
enough to incorporate it." (14,p.64) The infant incorporates the universe into 
his corporal activities; the preschooler assimilates the world to his symbolic 
play; the concrete operational child assimilates it to his empirical formula-
tions, and the adolescent incorporates the world into his grand schemes and 
theories. Once again, this supreme pinnacle of human achievement enslaves 
the preadolescent in a new kind of egocentricity - the metaphysical 
egocentricity. The messianic zeal to save humanity, to reform the world, and 
to change the establishment all stem from a cognitive mode of thought which 
transcends reality to the endless realm of possibilities. The egocentricity lies 
not in dreaming dreams, or formulating theories, or thinking possibilities, but 
in not recognizing the limitations which practical considerations of reality 
impose on the theoretical possibilities. Metaphysical egocentricity, then is a 
lack of differentiation between possibilities engendered by thought, and 
limitations imposed by reality. "The metaphysical egocentricity of the 
adolescent is gradually lessened as a reconciliation between formal thought 
and reality is effected. Equilibrium is attained when the adolescent 
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understands lilat the prop~r fun~,tion of reflection is not to contradict but to 
redict :[1l<i interpret expenence. (I4,p.64) 
P UkiIlLi, in his scholarly essay on "Egocentrism in Children and 
Adoles,": '11," lns interpreted this concept somewhat differently. He states: 
I i1:! 'c' U leu to illustrate the egocentric behavior of each major period of 
Jcy<?lopmL'nt particular emphasis upon the egocentrism of middle childhood and 
aJo!cSC'L'llc'C' \jw'!l of the material, particularly that on assumptive realities and cognitive 
'oncL'it of dlLlui-ag',e children and the imaginary audience and the personal fable of 
~JokSCL'"l' " ,pccillativc, in the sense that it is based as much on my clinical experience 
with \'lllln~ l'cp,-·k as it is on research data. (l,p.50) 
Any rsct of human behavior is complex and multidimensional, 
thl'reforc, i11lCl jlrdations "provided by dynamic psychology and psychiatry" 
(l.p.5~) Jlld itltel':l:tted insights provided by Piaget, Freud, Bruner, and others 
arc fruit r\tl, hut this writer has tried to stay within Piagctian framework in 
this essay. 
Piagc:\ ~lld lllhdder have referred to the process of equilibration in 
several of 1 htel[ writings, but more recently at thc opcning of the Jean Piaget 
Socic!\' :It rhibdephia in 1971 they elaborated upon this concept more fully 
(16), TIllL'<.' cJ:j<;si":dl factors - physical environment, innateness or hereditary 
program. "nd soctal transmission (language and education) - have been 
generally ~!ccc:pted as pertinent to cognitive development. Piaget has 
postulateJ :1 fourth factor, equilibration, which coordinates those three. This 
coordination itself is a kind of equilibration. A subject may go through trial 
and error, or compensate contradictions, use feedback information, or m"y 
resort tel other regulations which are mostly self regulations. 
Ther,~ arc reglliations in the course of embryological development, what Wadding-
ton calls hc)n1corhesis. At the physiological level, homeostatis is a self-regulatory 
mechanism: similarly, in the nervous system, the ret1ex arc is a homeostat. On the level 
of human conduct and even at the level of logical operational thinking there are similar 
sdf-regll brOI',' mechanisms. (l6,p.l2) 
The equilibration process is mostly self regulatory. Equilibrium is the 
attained cumpensatioll as a result of self regulation. Piaget insists 011 a 
difference between eqUilibration as a process and equilibrium as an attained 
state. He discusses three kinds of equilibrium: (l) Equilibrium between 
assimilation and accommodation; (2) Equilibrium bctween subsystems; and 
(3) Equil iblium between parts and totality of knowledge at a given time (16). 
First, the child assimilates and integrates the environmental stimuli to the 
eXisting "competencies" and structures and in so doing it accommodates and 
modifies these very schemes to environmental stimuli. 
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hypotheses and assumptions on the one hand and empirical evidence on the 
other. It is this lack of differentiation between assumption and fact that 
constitutes the egocentricity of the concrete operational period." (I,p.SS) 
The egocentricity of this period has two characteristics: it is limited by 
There is a bipolarity, where the Sllbjec1 i' assimilating the object in his schemes and 
at the same time accommodating his schemes to the special characteristics of the object. 
And in this bi;)ularity and sharing of processes there is already a factor af equilibration 
between dssimilation and accommodation. (16,p.2) 
In another place Piaget states, "Egocentrism must obviously be defined 
not only by primacy of assimilation over accommodation, but by lack of 
equilibrium between the two processes, one or other alternately predominat-
ing." (lO,p.290) 
The second kind of equilibrium refers to the equilibrium between 
subsystems. The child may use two systems, e.g. number and length 
separately and experience no conflict between numerical and ordinal 
reference. But in experiments conducted by Inhelder and associates (16) 
where children had to integrate the two systems simultaneously, they 
experienced conflict and used self regulatory mechanisms. lnhelder reported 
(16) a learning experimen t where subjects had to construct a road "just as 
long as" and parallel to the experimenter's road, but with shorter matches. In 
this experiment, the self regulatory mechanism of equilibration proceeded 
through four steps: (1) No contradiction was felt and children used the two 
systems separately; (2) Conscious of the contradiction, they used the two 
systems alternately; (3) Inadequate effort at integration and resorting to 
compromise solution; and (4) Reciprocal adjustment instead of posthoc 
correction. When the two separate subsystems have been integrated or when 
equilibrium is attained, the child will explain "you need more matches when 
they are small, and the road goes less far but it has zig zags." 
The third kind of equilibrium is between parts of knowledge a subject 
has and totality of knowledge at a given moment. There is differentiation into 
parts and integration of parts back into the whole or the total "structure 
d'ensamble." Piaget states that his cognitive equilibrium is quite different 
from the equilibrium in physics where it is a question of a balance of forces. 
Cognitive equilibrium is a system in which all parts are interdependent - there 
is a cycle of interaction among parts and it is open to influences from the 
outside. "This equilibrium between the integration and the differentiation of 
the parts in the whole has no eqUivalent in physics. It is only found in 
biological and cognitive equilibrium." (I6,p.l9) 
Each developmental level reflects a genuine and consistent form of 
mental organization. In other words, each developmental level has its own 
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d of' eoocentrism or centrism. The sensory motor child has difficulty bron b . • 
d'fferentiating between self and nonself; the preoperatIOnal child has to 
,; aratc the symbol from the thing symbolized; the concrete operational 
"l~ld has tll differentiate between the data and the data derived conclusions; 
~ d the formal operational child has to distinguish between his abstract 
a1I1 'es and practical considerations of reality. Egocentrism increases t leon ' ..  . . 
whenever the child has to cope with a new field of cogmhve actIOn, and 
'ubsidcs when he has mastered it, only to reassert itself. It is an achievement 
, s well as a limitation; equilibrium as well as disequilibrium. The cognitive 
~cvelopmcnt over one's life span may be explained by "egocentrism/centrism-
dcccntrism!cquilibration-equilibrium" model. "The ebb and flow of 
t'ooccntrIsm across ontogenetic development is, of course, an expression -
ahnost a simplified restatement - of the general equilibration model which 
Piaget imputes to cognitive evolution ... "(2,p.224) 
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